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The Satirists and the Experts 
 
Paddy Bullard, University of Reading. 
Biographical note. Paddy Bullard is Associate Professor of English Literature and 
Book History at the University of Reading. He is the author of Edmund Burke and the 
Art of Rhetoric, and editor of several collections of essays, including the forthcoming 
Oxford Handbook of Eighteenth-Century Satire. 
 
 
 
On 3 June 2016 the Secretary of State for Justice, Michael Gove, made a declaration 
on live television that became a theme in the campaign for Britain to leave the EU: 
‘The people in this country have had enough of experts’, he told Faisal Islam during 
an interview on Sky News.1 Gove was referring to the list of expert ‘organizations 
with acronyms’ (the IFS, IMF, CBI, and NHS) that had failed to predict the stock 
market crash of 2007, but that were now warning against the financial consequences 
of Brexit, for which Gove was a leading campaigner. With quick journalistic instinct 
Islam ignored Gove’s qualifications and pressed him on the sound-bite: ‘you’ve had 
enough of experts?’ he asked incredulously. Here was an idea likely to offend any 
professional, anyone with a university degree: that it is good for ordinary citizens to 
follow their political instinct, and positively to distrust the evidence-based caution of 
political specialists. 
     In fact Gove’s statement was not as surprising as Islam pretended. Donald Trump 
had been attacking claims to privileged expertise from the university-educated ‘liberal 
elite’ throughout his campaigns for the Republican nomination and US Presidency 
that summer, a refrain that was being taken up by economic nationalists around the 
world. The extension of a specific criticism of international high finance to a general 
criticism of the cosmopolitan, professional, ‘expert’ classes was one that people on 
both sides of the argument over populist politics were willing to make, including the 
political scientists. In July 2016 the economist and former US Treasury Secretary 
                                                          
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGgiGtJk7MA, accessed 23 May 2017. 
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Larry Summers noted drily that ‘the willingness of people to be intimidated by 
experts into supporting cosmopolitan outcomes appears for the moment to have been 
exhausted’.2  Looking at the wider role of the expert professional classes in civil 
society, Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels quoted approvingly in their book 
Democracy for Realists (2016) the nineteenth-century crowd psychologist Gustave le 
Bon, who saw no necessary connection between learned expertise and political 
competence:  
It does not follow because an individual knows Greek or mathematics, is 
an architect, a veterinary surgeon, a doctor, or a barrister, that he is 
endowed with a special intelligence of social questions… Were the 
electorate solely composed of persons stuffed with sciences their votes 
would be not better than those emitted at present.3  
For Achen and Bartels, doctors and lawyers share with ordinary ‘inattentive people’ 
the same conceptual limitations and personal biases in their political thinking. It just 
happens that their rationalizations are better rehearsed. ‘Even among unusually well-
informed and politically engaged people,’ they wrote, ‘the political preferences and 
judgments that look and feel like the bases of partisanship and voting behaviour are, 
in reality, often consequences of party and group loyalties’.4 What political experts 
really need is the advice of meta-experts who could train them in the elimination of 
their own biases.  
     There is plenty of scope for irony and paradox in these arguments. British satirists 
had spotted their potential decades before Brexit. In an episode of the 1980s political 
comedy Yes, Minister, Jim Hacker finds himself at loggerheads with Sir Wally 
McFarlane, a senior scientist whose plan for a new chemical plant on Merseyside has 
met with local opposition. When McFarlane promises ‘as a chemist myself’ that the 
plant is safe, Hacker asks him why ‘you experts always think you are right’? Met with 
a familiar incredulity, Hacker soon finds himself defending his own lack of specialism 
as a politician: ‘Ministers are not experts’, he insists. ‘Ministers are put in charge 
                                                          
2 Lawrence Summers, ‘Voters Deserve Responsible Nationalism’, Financial Times, 10 July 2016, quoted by David 
Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (London: Hurst, 2017), 91. 
3 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive 
Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 311, quoting Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the 
Popular Mind (Mineola: Dover, 2002), 122. 
4 Achen and Bartles, Democracy for Realists, 310, 268. 
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precisely because they know nothing’.5 Gove would probably sympathize. Surely the 
proper objects of satire are the experts, the Sir Wallys, with their prickly pomposity 
and fragile predictions? Why is it always the honest, inattentive everyman who gets 
ridiculed? 
     The expert’s role in government has long been a point of difficulty for political 
theorists. A basic problem for anyone trying to trace the history of that difficulty is 
that our modern denominative use of the word ‘expert’ to indicate a specialist person 
dates only to the nineteenth century. Before that the word was invariably adjectival, 
and closer in meaning to the etymological roots that it shares with ‘experience’.6 
‘Expert’ persons were associated with practice and habituation, and not with 
theoretical science or university training as they are in common usage today. The 
word has performed a small somersault in signification since the seventeenth century. 
In his essay ‘Of Studies’ Francis Bacon presents the relation of ‘Expert Men’ to 
learned persons as one of opposition, not identification: 
For Expert Men can Execute, and perhaps Iudge of particulars, one by one; 
But the generall Counsels, and the Plots, and Marshalling of Affaires, come 
best from those that are Learned… Crafty Men Contemne Studies; Simple 
Men Admire them; and Wise Men Use them: For they teach not their owne 
Use; But that is a Wisdome without them, and aboue them, won by 
Obseruation.7 
‘Expert Men’ and crafty men correspond with one another, says Bacon, but it is only 
expertise modified by observation that has the potential to transform general studies 
into practical wisdom. The republican James Harrington changed Bacon’s emphasis 
slightly when he quoted these two sentences (reversing their order as he did so, 
placing more emphasis on the word ‘Crafty’) in The Commonwealth of Oceana 
(1656). Trainee statesmen should certainly drink at the fountains of science, 
Harrington commented, even if they learn nothing of substance at university: ‘But 
what though the water [i.e. academic knowledge] a man drinks be not nourishment? It 
                                                          
5 Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, ‘The Greasy Pole’, The Complete Yes Minister: The Diaries of a Cabinet 
Minister (London: BBC Books, 1984), 247-270, at 265. 
6 OED 
7 Francis Bacon, The Essayes or Counsels, Ciuill and Morall (1625), 292-3; for Bacon’s revisions of this passage 
since the 1597 Essaies emphasizing ‘experience’ see B.H.G. Wormald, Francis Bacon: History, Politics and 
Science, 1561-1626 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 207. 
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is the vehiculum without which he cannot be nourished’. 8  This is a creative 
misreading of Bacon’s point, which is that learned sciences provide the contents of 
wisdom, but happen to ‘teach not their own use’. The experience that does teach 
practice is for Bacon a mere vehicle of political science. Harrington, using the same 
terms, assumes that only observation or experience of state councils can provide 
substantial knowledge for government.  
     Something that Bacon and Harrington share, however, is a sense that the broad 
categories of learning and experience, when focused on the question of political 
expertise, ought really to be triangulated against a third category of political doing, 
which they call ‘craft’. Learning sits above experience in Bacon’s tricolonic rhetoric, 
and political craft lies somewhere below it, perhaps providing it with practical 
foundations, or perhaps subverting it. Harrington’s figurative language inclines more 
often to the former possibility. Introducing a legislative ‘model’ for Oceana’s 
constitution, for example, he describes its authors approvingly as master craftsmen, 
‘workmen that squar’d every stone to this structure in the quarrys of antient 
prudence’.9 This is a triangle of categories – the scholar, the expert (or person of 
experience), the craftsman – by which everything that seems solid and foundational in 
politics and everything that is most provisional and personal can be gathered together. 
     During the first half of the eighteenth century something surprising happened to 
this cluster of political keywords. Arguments about statecraft, expertise and the 
professionalization of politics – arguments that were useful but not important to 
earlier writers – briefly became central to the public discussion of politics. The most 
conspicuous indication of this trend was the title of The Craftsman, the political 
journal founded by Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke and William Pulteney in 
December 1726, at the start of their determined campaign of opposition to the 
administration of Sir Robert Walpole. Its chief contributor and editor was the satirical 
journalist Nicholas Amhurst, until his masters sought accommodation with the 
government in 1737. The Craftsman became the longest-running and most famous 
opposition periodical of the period. 10  In the first number ‘Caleb D’Anvers’ (the 
                                                          
8 James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 199. 
9 Harrington, Oceana, 72. 
10 For the continuity of The Craftsman after the period of Amhurst’s editorship see Simon Varey, ‘The Publication 
of the Late Craftsman’, The Library 5th ser., 33 (1978), 230-33. 
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journal’s fictional editor) tells how The Craftsman was chosen as a general title under 
which to  
lay open the Frauds, Abuses, and secret Iniquities of all Professions, not 
excepting my own [i.e. the law]; which is at present notoriously adulterated 
with pernicious mixtures of Craft, and several scandalous Prostitutions.11  
Caleb’s ‘chief business’, however, is ‘to unravel the dark Secrets of Political Craft, 
and trace it through all its various Windings and intricate Recesses’. To the first 
readers of The Craftsman this sort of concern with political deceit, and with the 
corruption it was assumed to conceal, would have been familiar. It had been the 
common coin of partisan polemic since the Restoration. Relatively new, however, 
was the idea that abuses of government were best explained by analogy with a wider 
scene of corruption among expert members of the learned professions. It is not 
immediately clear why The Craftsman’s founders thought this comparison would be a 
powerful one. Similarly curious was their decision to describe corrupt professions 
(and corrupt statesmanship) in terms of their degeneration into ‘craft’. Artisans were 
objects of denigration in classical and humanist culture because their expertise was 
perceived to be illiberal, their understanding too narrow for the far-reaching affairs of 
state. It was on this basis, for example, that Jonathan Swift attacked lawyers as the 
professionals who ‘of all others seem least to understand the Nature of Government in 
general; like under-workmen, who are expert enough at making a single Wheel in a 
Clock, but are utterly ignorant how to adjust the several Parts, or regulate the 
Movement’.12 Craftsmen were also expected to be crafty, that is, distinguished by a 
shallow cunning or a tendency to deceit. In politics this sort of cunning corresponds 
with the ‘craft’ that Thomas Hobbes (borrowing another phrase from Francis Bacon) 
called ‘crooked wisdom’, a wisdom that prefers pusillanimous short-term fixes to the 
long views taken by more magnanimous statesmen.13 But again, it is not obvious why 
Bolingbroke and Pulteney chose these involved distinctions as the basis for a 
concerted campaign of popular satire. 
                                                          
11 The Craftsman. By Caleb D’Anvers, of Gray’s-Inn, Esq. 14 vols. (1731-37), vol. 1, 6.  
12 Sentiments of a Church of England Man (1711), in The Prose Writings of Jonathan Swift, ed. Herbert Davis et 
al., 16 vols., (Oxford: Blackwell, 1939-74), vol. 2, 23; cf. Gullivers Travels (1726), in Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Jonathan Swift, gen. ed. Ian Gadd et al., 17 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008-), vol. 
16, 371. 
13 Hobbes, Leviathan, 54; quoting Bacon, ‘Of Cunning’, Essayes, 127-134, at 127. 
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     Bolingbroke and Pulteney’s abiding concern with craft and expertise in politics 
was a widespread, even dominant one among political writers at the start of the 
eighteenth century. Michael Gove’s attack on the experts, in other words, echoes 
some old themes in British political thinking. The Craftsman’s readers would have 
understood these themes in terms of their relation to a broader anti-technical 
programme of statesmanship, one that also advocated ‘common sense’ as a positive 
model for political deliberation and ‘wit’ as a model for discourse.14 Satire was a 
common medium for articulating this programme, often in terms that were themselves 
doubled and ironized. It is significant that Bolingbroke himself refused Bacon’s 
categorical distinction between political craft and wisdom, arguing that ‘crooked 
wisdom’ was merely a corruption of true prudence: ‘Wisdom is neither left-handed, 
nor crooked,’ he commented in 1738, ‘but the heads of some men contain little, and 
the hearts of others employ it wrong’.15 This perceived continuity between craft and 
wisdom opened up ambiguities. Satirists loudly deplored secrecy and innuendo in 
political life and, at the same time, appropriated them as modes for oppositional 
satire. They attacked technical writing for dullness and, at the same time, reframed it 
as ‘mock-art’, a witty specification of expert practices that have no artistic content. 
The interrelations between these satirical themes and political topoi gave them a 
special power and significance at the start of the eighteenth century. But those 
interrelations now require some reconstruction. 
 
* * * 
 
When satirists wrote during the third and fourth decades of the eighteenth century 
about craft and expertise in politics they invariably had a particular expert in mind: 
Sir Robert Walpole, the First Lord of the Treasury from 1715 to 1717 and from 1721 
to 1742. Walpole enjoyed the reputation of a supreme political technician. Lord 
Chesterfield, one of his most effective critics after 1737, stated that ‘he was both the 
best parliament-man, and the ablest manager of parliament, that I believe ever lived… 
So clear in stating the most intricate matters, especially in the finances, that, whilst he 
                                                          
14 See Sophia Rosenfeld, Common Sense: A Political History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 
35-54. 
15  Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Political Writings, ed. David Armitage (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 255. 
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was speaking the most ignorant thought that they understood what they really did 
not’.16 This corresponds with J.H. Plumb’s summary assessment two centuries later, 
which emphasizes (without direct reference to Chesterfield) ‘the same technical 
competence, the same clarity, the same simplicity… Walpole’s abilities were most 
clearly recognized in his political expertise; in the dexterity with which he managed 
the House of Commons’. 17  ‘Dexterity’ is a characteristically Swiftian word for 
describing political ability, and Plumb could almost be recasting Swift’s own 
character of Walpole, sketched in an unpublished essay called ‘An Account of the 
Court and Empire of Japan’ (1728): Walpole ‘was perfectly skilled, by long practice,’ 
wrote Swift, ‘in the senatorial forms; and dexterous in the purchasing of votes, from 
those who could find their accounts better in complying with his measures, than they 
could probably lose by any tax that might be charged on the kingdom’.18 Walpole was 
a difficult target for literary satirists like Swift because he made no pretense of 
covering up what they took to be his moral failings. As Swift complained, ‘it is as 
hard to satirize well a Man of distinguished Vices, as to praise well a Man of 
distinguished Virtues. It is easy to do either to People of moderate Characters’.19 
Walpole controlled the maxim. His reliance on bribery and corruption was the charge 
repeated most insistently in the pages of The Craftsman and other opposition papers, 
but it is fascinating to see the effrontery with which he admitted the charges in, for 
example, his bullish parliamentary speech on the repeal of the Septennial Act in 1734: 
bribery was only practicable if no strong passions divided the electorate, he said, at 
which times it was politically irrelevant.20 This was the case, he argued, in 1734, and 
as such the principal complaint of opponents to his ministry was a trivial one. Indeed, 
Walpole’s bluff dismissal of the humanistic moral codes rehearsed so noisily by the 
Patriot opposition often gave a powerful negative energy to his politics. The challenge 
for his adversaries was to find a way of re-describing as shortcomings what were, in 
the terms of a political realist, substantial strengths. Walpole’s authority rested on his 
understanding of the public finances, and on his effectiveness as a public 
                                                          
16 Stanhope, Philip Dormer, fourth Earl of Chesterfield, Characters of Eminent Personages (1777) 18-19. 
17 J.H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole: The King’s Minister, 2 vols., London: The Cresset Press, 1960, vol. 2, 234, 2, 
Plumb’s emphasis. 
18 Swift, ‘An Account of the Court of the Empire of Japan’, Prose Writings, vol. 5, 101; Samuel Johnson quoted 
Swift’s Letter Concerning the Sacramental Text (1709) in A Dictionary of the English Language (1755), 5U2v, on 
‘Dexterity’, which he defined as ‘skill, expertness’ and as ‘quickness of expedience, skill of management’; see 
Swift, Prose Writings, vol. 2, 141. 
19 Swift, ‘Thoughts on Various Subjects’, Prose Writings, vol. 4, 243. 
20 Richard Chandler, The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons from the Restoration to the Present 
Time, 14 vols. (1722-4), vol. 8, 207-8; cf. Plumb, Walpole, vol. 2, 306-7. 
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administrator. So The Craftsman set out to present Walpole’s technical ability as 
fraudulent, shallow, corrupt – as an unstable and unpredictable form of expertise. 
     The satirical strategy indicated by The Craftsman’s title took on some of this 
conceptual instability itself. The metaphors and allegories used by the journal’s 
authors tend to blur the boundaries between straightforward artisanal expertise and 
despicable Daedalian cunning. In the first number ‘Caleb D’Anvers’ predicts that he 
will never run out of material because ‘the Mystery of State-Craft abounds with such 
innumerable Frauds, Prostitutions, and Enormities in all Shapes, and under all 
Disguises, that it is an inexhaustible Fund, and eternal resource for Satire’. 21 
Nevertheless, it was a resource that The Craftsman’s authors drew on fairly regularly. 
The great difference between ‘State Craftsmen’ and common artificers, writes ‘Jack 
Hinter’ in Craftsman no. 8, is that ordinary workmen expect to be rewarded in 
proportion to their talents, ‘and if they do not excel in their Professions, they do not 
thrive in them. But the Case is very often not the same amongst Those, who govern 
the great Affairs of the World’.22 A positive model of Renaissance statecraft follows 
in Craftsman no. 9, which contains extracts from a letter of Polonius-style advice 
from Bacon to the Duke of Buckingham, concerning the promotion of appropriately 
talented people to offices of state. ‘The Character of a great Man was not to be 
acquired, in those [Elizabethan] times,’ comments The Craftsman,  
by understanding the paltry Business of a Money-Scrivener, or a Stock-
jobber; by a Skill in Usury, Brokage, and the Tricks of Exchange-Alley; 
or by colloguing with certain great Bodies of Men, in order to defraud, 
bubble, and beggar the rest of the Nation.23  
Instead of possessing these Walpolean attainments, a statesman need only prove 
himself to be ‘a Man of great Knowledge, Depth, and Penetration in publick Affairs’. 
These positive qualities at first seem almost meaningless in their generality, but they 
are oriented significantly towards comprehensiveness of understanding. They are at 
odds categorically with the facility of the political technician, who prides himself 
instead on ‘ability’. ‘What are commonly called great Abilities, in this Age,’ 
according to Craftsman no. 99, ‘will appear, upon Enquiry, to be nothing but a little, 
sordid Genius for Tricks and Cunning, which founds all its Success on Corruption, 
                                                          
21 Craftsman, vol. 1, 6. 
22 Craftsman, vol. 1, 44. 
23 Craftsman, vol. 1, 50. 
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Stock-jobbing, and other iniquitous Arts’.24  The positive qualities associated with 
good statesmanship take a pastoral turn, in line with the anti-metropolitan tendency 
that often accompanies attacks on experts: ‘if you want a Man to employ in any 
particular Manufacture or mechanic Art, you will certainly chuse one, who is expert 
in that Particular; but in a Shepherd or a Steward, you desire nothing more than 
Frugality, Labour and Vigilance’. 25  Such, on the authority of Cicero, were the 
qualities that Rome expected in her magistrates, and such are the qualities that the 
British state now requires of its ‘stewards’.26 Once again, the generic attainments that 
we are told to demand of politicians are defined by contrast with the ‘expert’ 
specificity of the craftsman’s mechanic art. 
     What are the sources of this awkward, persistent analogy between politicians and 
artisans? Its origins certainly predate the rise of Walpole. The most prominent 
seventeenth-century elaboration of the ‘State Craftsman’ metaphor appears in the 
very first paragraph of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, in a rather different form to the 
one found in The Craftsman. Hobbes sets up an elaborate comparison between the 
artificial life of ‘Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as 
doth a watch)’, and the artificial constitution of ‘that great LEVIATHAN called a 
COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man’.27 At 
the risk of making the figure still more involved, Hobbes insists that both ‘the Matter 
thereof, and the Artificer… is Man’ – meaning natural man on this occasion.28 ‘State 
Craftsmen’ are they who make the ‘Artificiall Man’, the state. Hobbes sets up his 
metaphor to illustrate a materialistic theory of government, so the work of his state 
artificers is upon the very fabric (that is, the fundamental human materials) of the 
republic. As such they are different from the ‘State Craftsmen’ of the eighteenth-
century satirists, whose expertise lies in stockjobbing, brokerage and other activities 
peripheral to government itself.  
     As Hobbes’s contemporaries take up the figure of the craftsman they tend to shift 
its focus from political making to political doing. In The Commonwealth of Oceana 
Harrington transformed the idea of the statesman-as-artisan into a complex image of 
the state’s machinery gripping and turning its various parts against one another, 
                                                          
24 Craftsman, vol. 3, 92. 
25 Craftsman, vol. 3, 93. 
26 See Cicero, Pro Cnaeo Plancio, 62, used as the epigram for Craftsman, no. 99. 
27 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9. 
28 Hobbes, Leviathan, 10. 
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always maintaining the ‘rotation’ that was essential to his vision of the 
commonwealth: 
The councils of this commonwealth, both in regard of their elections, 
and, as will be shewn, of their affairs, are uniform with the senat in their 
revolutions; not as whirlpits to swallow, but to bite, and with the scrues 
of their rotation to hold and turn a business (like the vice of a smith) to 
the hand of the workman. Without engins of which nature it is not 
possible for the senat, much less for the people, to be perfect artificers in 
a political capacity…29 
Harrington’s use of the craft metaphor for political expertise shows a 
commonwealthsman’s optimism about the operability of what are to Hobbes always 
recalcitrant human materials. Admittedly, the figure was adaptable by those on the 
opposite side of the political spectrum: the royalist Sir Robert Filmer, defending the 
monarch’s right to conceal arcana imperii from his people, made an analogy with 
artisanal mysteries: ‘an implicit faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft. 
How much more is it, then, due to a prince in the profoundest secrets of government 
[?]’.30 More straightforwardly satirical is Samuel Butler’s portrait of the Presbyterian 
politician Anthony Ashley Cooper (later first Earl of Shaftesbury, and Dryden’s 
Achitophel) in part three (1678) of Hudibras. This is a breathless tale of low cunning, 
side-switching and luck dressed up as expertise: 
By all these Arts, and many more 
H’ had practic’d long and much before, 
Our State-Artificer foresaw, 
Which way the World began to draw… 
He therefore wisely cast about, 
All ways he could, t’insure his Throat.31 
The difference here is that Butler’s Ashley Cooper is someone who operates from the 
outside on political institutions built up by other hands, almost at arm’s length. He is 
distinct from the Hobbesian artificer, whose actions seem positively to constitute the 
commonwealth, and from the Harringtonian workman, who holds his materials within 
                                                          
29 James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 123. 
30 Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and other Writings, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 3-4. 
31 Samuel Butler, Hudibras, ed. John Wilders (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 245. 
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an anxious grip. The craft of Butler’s ‘State-Artificer’ is an ephemeral cunning, 
narrowly political and operative mainly on the material of his own career. It is a 
diversion from the serious business of state, but it has the potential to cause 
considerable political damage. 
 
* * *  
 
The writer who transforms the statesman-as-artisan metaphor into a grand satirical 
theme is Jonathan Swift. Hobbesian and Harringtonian metaphors of political 
workmanship are mixed together at the very start of the ‘Preface’ to A Tale of Tub 
(1704), Swift’s first major satire, and one for which politics are a marginal but 
significant concern. The empty tub of the title is a decoy thrown out by sailors on the 
ship of state to divert a restive popular whale:  
The Whale was interpreted to be Hobs’s Leviathan, which tosses and 
plays with all other Schemes of Religion and Government, whereof a 
great many are hollow, and dry, and empty, and noisy, and wooden, 
and given to Rotation. This is the Leviathan from when the terrible 
Wits of our Age are said to borrow their Weapons… And it was 
decreed, that in order to prevent these Leviathans [i.e. the wits] from 
tossing and sporting with the Commonwealth, (which of itself is too 
apt to fluctuate) they should be diverted from that Game by a Tale of a 
Tub.32 
What Swift finds irresistible is the blend of ordinariness and extravagance in the 
language that Hobbes, Harrington and their contemporaries use to describe political 
processes. The tenor of that language is witty and rather eccentric, he notices, and yet 
its vehicle moves irresistibly downwards into a world of artificers and workmen, 
mariners and coopers. Of course Swift exaggerates both of these tendencies. He seizes 
on ‘mechanic’ images of empty barrels, rotating lathes and foundering ships, and 
turns them into a series of divagating rhetorical automata, each with its own artificial 
life. They generate in turn streams of images and interpretations, possessed of an 
unpredictable logic, which is harnessed self-reflexively by Swift in his writing. In 
                                                          
32 CWJS, vol. 1, 25. 
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‘The Introduction’ to the Tale we are presented with three ‘Oratorical Machines’ for 
the use of ‘Orators who desire to talk much without Interruption’, namely the pulpit 
(or ‘tub’), the scaffold ladder and the fairground stage. It seems that the most reliable 
‘machines’ for distracting modern wits away from politics, as the Tale of a Tub itself 
proposes to do, are books, some of which have an animal life of their own in the 
passage above (as they have in the Tub’s first appendix, ‘The Battel of the Books’). 
At the end of the ‘Introduction’ the Tale’s narrator lists the ‘prime Productions’ of the 
society of Grub Street authors to which he belongs. First and foremost in the list is a 
manual of statecraft, published under the suspiciously familiar chapbook title, ‘the 
History of Reynard the Fox’. The narrator doubts that ‘any of the Learned will 
dispute, that famous Treatise to be a compleat Body of Civil Knowledge, and the 
Revelation, or rather the Apocalyps of all State-Arcana’. 33  The abstract tells us 
enough: this is a practical handbook of arcana imperii, laid out in the alchemist’s 
empyric style, finished off with a not-so-practical flourish of millennialism. This 
pushes the combination of imaginative eccentricity and artisanal practicality in 
political writing as far as it will go – in theory, at least. 
     There is an assumption lying behind Swift’s satire here, one that he wants to 
normalize, but does not think to make explicit: that politics is a vocation for which no 
expert knowledge (as opposed to general learning) is required, and with which narrow 
technical training is categorically incompatible. The authors of Cato’s Letters stated 
the case straightforwardly in 1721: ‘Of all the sciences that I know in the world’, 
wrote Thomas Gordon,  
…that of government concerns us most, and is the easiest to be known, 
and yet is the least understood. Most of those who manage it would make 
the lower world believe that there is I know not what difficulty and 
mystery in it, far above vulgar understandings; which proceeding of theirs 
is direct craft and imposture: Every ploughman knows a good government 
from a bad one, from the effects of it.34 
The three components of Gordon’s argument – the idea that the knowledge of politics 
is easy and open, that it contrasts with closed mysteries of the craftsman, and, 
implicitly, that it corresponds with the georgic knowledge of the farmer – sit together 
                                                          
33 CWJS, vol. 1, 42-3. 
34 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters, ed. Ronald Hamowy, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1995), vol. 1, 267 [no. 38, 22 July 1721]. 
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in way that is familiar from classical and humanist tradition. They are configured 
similarly, for example, by Xenophon in the Oeconomicus: farming prepares men for 
military and political leadership by making them hardy and generous of spirit, where 
handicrafts make them soft and selfish; husbandry, moreover, is ‘easily learn’d, by 
observing the Workmen now and then, and by consulting those who understand it… 
Artificers, will always keep some Secret of their Business to themselves, but the 
Husbandmen are open and free in their Discoveries’. 35  Perhaps the figure of the 
virtuous farmer-patriot did not have the same positive impact on the English political 
imagination as it did on the commonwealthsmen of the American colonies.36 The 
negative side of Xenophon’s configuration, however – the denigration of closed craft 
knowledge, the analogy with civic life – resonated widely, and gives a context for 
Swift’s otherwise obscure satire on mechanics in the Tale. 
     Where the network of values that constructs statesmanship as easy and open (with 
husbandry as its analogue, and craftsmanship as its opposite) remains largely implicit 
in the Tale, it is fully articulated in Gulliver’s Travels. Swift returns to the anti-expert 
theme at several points across Gulliver’s four journeys, and we see it elaborated 
differently in various moral contexts. In each of the four journeys that Gulliver 
undertakes there is technical excellence to be wondered at, since he has the 
utopianist’s good fortune only to be shipwrecked in advanced civilizations. Lilliput is 
remarkable for its (relatively) enormous ‘machines fixed on wheels’ and its 
sophisticated systems of civil bureaucracy; Brobdingnag has its (relatively) fine-
fingered carpenters, seamstresses and locksmiths; Laputa, of course, is itself an 
artificial flying island, although its pilots do not seem to know quite how it works; 
and the land of the Houyhnhnms has a domestic architecture remarkable in its way for 
convenience and stoic simplicity. 37  Moreover, in each of the four journeys the 
connection between expert regime and political system is made explicit. In 
Brobdingnag, the wise king is astonished to hear that Europe has produced thousands 
of technical books ‘written upon the Art of Government’: foolish Gulliver is surprised 
in turn when the king confines ‘Knowledge of governing within very Narrow Bounds; 
to common Sense and Reason, to Justice and Lenity’, and when he argues in terms 
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familiar from Xenophon that the farmer who ‘could make two ears of corn… grow 
upon a Spot of Ground where only one grew before; would deserve better of 
Mankind, and do more essential Service to his Country, than the whole Race of 
Politicians put together’.38  In Balnibarbi, the retired statesman Lord Munodi tells 
Gulliver how expert ‘Professors’ have imposed ‘new Rules and Methods of 
Agriculture and Building, and new Instruments and Tools for all Trades and 
Manufactures’ on the populace, with famine and impoverishment the results of their 
untried technologies.39 The consequences of this meddling are social, but Gulliver 
also explores their governmental analogue in his account of a disastrous ‘School for 
political Projectors’.40 In the land of the Houyhnhnms, the central criticism levelled 
by Gulliver’s master at European society – that we have been ‘very successful in 
multiplying our original Wants, and seemed to spend our whole Lives in vain 
Endeavours to supply them by our own Inventions’ – is expressed both in disdain for 
the material overproduction of modern manufacturers, and contempt for the 
overproduction of civil discourse that Swift identifies particularly with lawyers.41 
Swift’s expressions and opinions on this topic are drawn from those attributed to the 
Utopians described by the traveller Raphael Hythloday in More’s Utopia. They too 
think it an ‘unreasonable thing to oblige men to obey a body of laws that are both of 
such a bulk, and so dark as not to be read and understood by every one of the 
subjects.’ More establishes the positive utopian model for a minimalist legislature 
based on a clearly expressed and compassable body of legal precepts. By contrast 
Gulliver’s wisest interlocutors are concerned negatively with how social degeneration 
and political corruption go together with the tendency of learned experts to impose 
themselves on others. 
     The clearest statement of this idea, delivered in terms similar to those used a few 
years before by Gordon in Cato’s Letters, is made when Gulliver describes the 
foundations of the Lilliputian constitution in Part I of the Travels. There is a 
surprising shift of tone here, from the earlier satirical depiction of the Lilliputians as 
treacherous petty-Machiavellians, to a utopian discourse on their political ideas. As 
Gulliver reports, 
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In chusing Persons for all Employments, [the Lilliputians] have more 
Regard to good Morals than to great Abilities; For, since Government is 
necessary to Mankind, they believe, that the common Size of human 
Understandings, is fitted to some Station or other; and that Providence 
never intended to make the Management of publick Affairs a Mystery, to 
be comprehended only by a few Persons of sublime Genius, of which there 
seldom are three born in an Age: But, they suppose Truth, Justice, 
Temperance, and the like, to be in every Man’s Power; the Practice of 
which Virtues, assisted by Experience and a good Intention, would qualify 
any Man for the Service of his Country...42 
Indeed, it is positively dangerous to entrust public affairs to people distinguished by 
‘superior endowments of the Mind’, because their abilities are likely to be employed 
in managing and defending their corruptions. The difference between these utopian 
principles and the prescriptions for an expert-free civil society made by Gordon in 
Cato’s Letters is that Gulliver stamps the former with a providential, universal 
authority. As Swift wrote in an earlier, unpublished pamphlet, Some Free Thoughts 
Upon the Present State of Affairs (1714), ‘God has given the Bulk of Mankind a 
Capacity to understand Reason when it is fairly offered; and by Reason they would 
easily be governed, if it were left to their Choice’.43 All that is needed to support this 
natural reason are the virtues of equity, good intentions and a certain amount of 
‘Experience’ – the last requirement placing the ‘Management of publick Affairs’ 
rather more in the realm of Bacon’s common ‘Expert Men’ than the republican and 
elitist Cato’s Letters would have allowed. The providential frame for Swift’s 
description of a politics without professionalized mysteries indicates its service to a 
vision of the common good. 
 
* * * 
 
What can the satire that Swift wrote against technocrats tell us about the crisis of 
public trust in which the expert classes find themselves today? The long historical 
perspective foregrounds one particularly striking point of contrast. Swift and his 
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contemporaries were writing about a new order of state artificers. Their resentment 
was exacerbated by the undeniable ascendency of these experts: they hated their 
modernity, and the effectiveness with which they had captured the public narrative of 
what a prosperous and stable future might look like. In other words, Swift knew that 
he was writing at the beginning of something. He recognized the Whiggish dawn, 
however indistinctly it illuminated the coming order of a progressive, rights-based 
universalist liberalism. His own humanistic vision of simple civil societies 
underpinned by ancient virtue belonged either in the past, or in no place at all – in 
utopia, which is why satire and irony were the appropriate modes in which to 
articulate it. By contrast, the contemporary assault on our professional and expert 
classes is based precisely on the failure of these classes to capture the future. The 
experts could not predict the fall of financial systems, or anticipate the unraveling of 
globalized economic networks by maverick, inexpert nationalist politicians. Neither 
could they foresee their own marginalization in the world that they created. At the 
same time, satire finds it harder to articulate itself fully in the context of these 
changes, because we are at the end of something, not yet at a beginning. There is a 
meaningful hesitation in Swift’s writing between, on the one hand, the pleasure he 
takes in solid, ingenious workmanship and, on the other, his distaste for the 
translation of that ingenuity into the world of politics. His sympathetic hesitations 
have their analogues in modern political discourse as well, especially on the 
communitarian left. In 1944 the political economist Karl Polanyi used the term 
‘statecraft’ to describe the raft of enlightened measures by which Tudor statesman 
made the social upheavals caused by rapid economic improvement bearable.44 The 
Labour thinker Maurice Glasman has adopted Polanyi’s term to label his own call for 
moralized state intervention in national skill formation (‘virtue and vocation’), while 
his parliamentary ally Jon Cruddas has long been elaborating his vision of a ‘one-
national statecraft’. 45  If the tropes used by Swift and The Craftsman to attack 
Walpole’s new order of experts have not retained their polemical charge, the 
paradoxes and ambiguities may have some use for communitarian thinkers yet. 
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